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CAP IMPACTS ON LABOUR USE IN EAST GERMAN AGRICULTURE 
Abstract 
Our aim is to investigate whether the direct payments and rural development measures of the 
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) do make jobs in agriculture safer. We work with a 
dynamic labour demand equation that is augmented by the full set of policy instruments of the 
CAP. It is estimated on a unique regional panel dataset of three East German states for the pe-
riod 1999-2006. We present results for three consistent estimators which differ in how they 
eliminate the fixed effects and how they instrument the lagged dependent variable, including 
estimators due to Arellano and Bond, Blundell and Bond, and a corrected least-squares 
dummy variable estimator due to Kiviet and Bruno. Our results suggest that there were few 
desirable effects on job maintenance or job creation in agriculture. While there is some indica-
tion that investment subsidies have halted labour shedding on farms, the introduction of the 
fully decoupled Single Farm Payment has likely contributed to significant job losses. 
Keywords: Agricultural employment; Dynamic panel data models; Common Agricultural 
Policy; East Germany. 
JEL-codes: Q18; J43; C23. 
1  Introduction 
Agricultural employment poses a dilemma for policy makers in Europe. On the one hand, ag-
riculture’s share in employment of all West European economies has been constantly declin-
ing for decades (TRACY 1993). On the other hand, many citizens expect that safeguarding jobs 
should be the top priority of government. Following this logic, politicians and farm lobbyists 
regularly claim that a protective agricultural policy is indispensable for keeping jobs in the 
first sector. Furthermore, it is argued that agriculture has much potential to also provide envi-
ronmental services, contribute to quality of life in rural areas, and supply raw material for en-
ergy production. The “second pillar” instruments of the European Union’s (EU) Common Ag-
ricultural Policy (CAP), such as investment aid, agro-environmental payments, and a broad 
range of rural development measures, are supposed to create employment via these additional 
functions (see, e.g., EC 2006). The aim of the present article is to investigate empirically 
whether the various CAP measures actually do make jobs in agriculture safer. 
In the literature, sluggish labour adjustment in agriculture has been a long-standing issue. One 
prominent line of research has treated labour as a quasi-fix asset and studied interrelated fac-
tor demand functions in a framework of dynamic duality based on EPSTEIN and DENNY 
(1983). While the focus has more commonly been on capital, labour fixity has been investi-
gated by several studies as well (VASAVADA and CHAMBERS, 1986; STEFANOU et al., 1992; 
PIETOLA and MYERS, 2000). These approaches establish a strong link between theory and es-
timation, but they have rarely been used to directly analyse policy effects on labour adjust-
ment. Lacking data at the farm level may be one of the reasons for this neglect, however, it is 
also unclear how policy measures could be included in the dynamic duality formulation em-
ployed by these approaches. Recently, in studying capital investments, SCKOCKAI and MORO 
(2009) and SERRA et al. (2009) have made area payments an argument of the intertemporal 
utility function of the farmer. While this may be regarded a pragmatic solution, it is less clear 
how it could be extended to other policy measures. For example, several of the rural devel-
opment measures are not even paid to farmers directly, but rather to local governments or 
downstream processors. Furthermore, if the analysis of policy effects moves to the centre of 
analysis, unobserved heterogeneity of beneficiaries and the endogeneity of programme par-
  
ticipation becomes a core methodological problem (BESLEY and CASE, 2000; BLUNDELL and 
COSTA DIAS, 2009; HECKMAN and VYTLACIL, 2007). The use of panel data methods has pro-
liferated in this area, however, the highly non-linear models in the tradition of intertemporal 
factor demand analysis have hardly been able to exploit the power of these methods. 
In the following, our goal is to estimate policy effects on labour use in agriculture. Our work-
horse is a dynamic labour demand equation that is augmented by the full set of policy instru-
ments of the CAP. We estimate this on a unique regional panel dataset of the three East Ger-
man States Brandenburg, Saxony, and Saxony-Anhalt. The slightly unbalanced dataset con-
tains seven years of observations for 69 counties (Landkreise). Focusing on a single linearised 
equation allows us to make use of recent methodological advances in the analysis of dynamic 
panel data. Furthermore, by way of regional aggregation, we can consider the entire portfolio 
of first- and second-pillar measures simultaneously. 
The main part of the paper considers a quantitative evaluation of policy effects that builds on 
current methods for estimating dynamic panel data models with fixed effects. We provide re-
sults of a least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) model with a first order autoregressive lag as 
a naïve reference model. This model is known to give biased results but has the general prop-
erty of producing small standard errors. There is an ongoing discussion which alternative per-
forms best in samples of a moderate number of cross-sectional units, N, and a small number 
of periods, T. We present results for three consistent estimators which differ in how they 
eliminate the fixed effects and how they instrument the lagged dependent variable. We con-
sider estimators due to ARELLANO and BOND (1991), BLUNDELL and BOND (1998), and a cor-
rected LSDV estimator due to KIVIET (1995) and BRUNO (2005a). Our results suggest that 
there were few desirable effects on job maintenance or job creation in agriculture. While there 
is some indication that investment subsidies have halted labour shedding on farms, the intro-
duction of the fully decoupled Single Farm Payment (SFP) has likely contributed to signifi-
cant job losses. 
2  The CAP in East Germany and hypotheses about its effects on labour use 
While farm structures are regarded as internationally competitive, politicians in the East Ger-
man Länder place much hope on the ability of agriculture to provide additional services and 
create new jobs, beyond their traditional role of producing food and fibre.
1 As a result of 
Agenda 2000 and Mid-term review reforms of the CAP, East German Länder have been 
spending about two thirds of their CAP budget on direct payments, of which 75 percent are 
co-financed by the EU. The Single Farm Payment (SFP) was implemented in 2005. In addi-
tion, East German States implemented a region-specific mix of second pillar measures. The 
emphasis is on instruments under the umbrella of “development of rural areas”. These are 
mostly related to infrastructure investments, such as road construction and improvement, and 
are usually disbursed to local municipalities. The second largest portion of the second pillar 
measures goes to agro-environmental measures, which include payments for the maintenance 
of extensive grassland and the conversion to organic farming. In addition, some ten to twenty 
million euro are spent on compensatory allowances for less favoured areas (LFA), as well as 
on investment aids and processing and marketing support. While the former represents sup-
port for regions with below average soil conditions, the latter two are credit subsidies for a 
wide range of capital investments on farms and in the downstream sector. 
We hypothesise the following effects of these policy measures: 
                                                 
1   This is documented in various policy statements at the state level, for example in the Agricultural Report of 
the Land Brandenburg (MINISTERIUM FÜR LÄNDLICHE ENTWICKLUNG, UMWELT UND VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ 
DES LANDES BRANDENBURG (MLUV) 2008). 
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1.  Direct payments coupled to certain production activities, such as field crops or livestock 
rearing, will induce additional employment if more workers are required to maintain these 
activities. However, as payments were no longer coupled to the level of output generated 
already in the beginning of the period observed here, allocation effects will be small. Di-
rect payments and payments for less-favoured areas will have no effect on labour use if 
they are fully decoupled.
2 A shift from a coupled to a decoupled policy regime, as implied 
by the CAP reform implemented in 2005, will therefore tend to release employment. 
2.  Most of the public goods investments, both for “rural development” or “processing and 
marketing”, can be assumed to generate higher output prices (if only by reducing transac-
tion or transport cost) and thus tend to increase labour use. Some may also reduce adjust-
ment costs by making it easier to hire or release labour, and thus also increase equilibrium 
labour use. 
3.  Capital subsidies will reduce labour demand if labour and capital are substitutes, but will 
induce it if they are complements.  
4.  Agri-environmental payments are linked to certain types of output which generate positive 
environmental externalities (for example, protection of biodiversity or a certain landscape, 
or reduced soil erosion). They hence make the production of these outputs economically 
more attractive. If these outputs are produced by using a more labour-intensive technology 
than conventional outputs, they will increase labour demand.  
It is hence not unfounded to expect that agricultural policies may have positive effects on ag-
ricultural employment, although effects of different policy packages may be of opposite direc-
tion. What the effects are in reality is an empirical question that is addressed next. 
3  Empirical strategy 
3.1  Deriving an estimating equation 
Our approach is to analyse policy effects on long-term labour equilibrium by focusing on a 
single dynamic labour equation. As the impact on agricultural employment may vary substan-
tially among policy measures and may even be of opposite sign, we argue that it is necessary 
to analyse their influence simultaneously. Several of the policy measures are not directly paid 
to agricultural firms, in particular, processing and marketing as well as rural development 
funds. However, annual payment streams disaggregated by measures are available at the re-
gional (Landkreis) level. We therefore conduct the analysis at this level and assume that the 
model applies to a regionally representative farm. As we linearise the model below, it can be 
regarded as a consistent aggregation of individual farms. 
We postulate that optimal employment is determined by the following set of factors: 
(1)    j jt jt jt Z Z p G L ,
~
, , * jt   ,  
where   is the projected long-term agricultural employment in region j at time t,  * jt L jt   is a 
vector of policy expenses that vary across regions and periods,   is a vector of regionalised 




 is a vector of regional characteristics that also vary 
                                                 
2   It has been argued that they may increase factor use via wealth and insurance effects (HENNESSY 1998). 
SCKOKAI and MORO (2009) have shown recently for Italy that the risk-related effect of direct payments is 
small. 
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across time and space, and  j Z  a vector of time-invariant regional characteristics, including 
land endowments. Such an equation can be motivated by a neoclassical dynamic labour de-
mand model, such as discussed in HAMERMESH (1993, chapter 6). 
Actual labour adjustment to optimal labour is sluggish, for example due to the presence of 
convex adjustment costs, and governed by a coefficient of adjustment  1 0     in discrete 
time as follows: 
(2)   1 1 *      t t t t L L L L   .  
Solving (2) for   and inserting  t L (1) yields an estimable reduced-form equation of  . Linear-
ising this equation gives the following expression: 
t L
(3)  jt j jt jt jt jt jt Z Z p L L               4 3 2 1 1
~
,  
where  i   and   are parameter vectors to be estimated and  jt    an identically and independ-
ently distributed error term. Note that this partial adjustment model provides an estimate of 
the coefficient of adjustment, as 
is 
    oncerning the effects of policy measures on la-
bour demand, short-run and long-run effects have to be distinguished. Policies may affect cur-
rent labour demand immediately, as measured by  1
1 . C
 . However, there is also a long-term ef-
fect via the dynamic adjustment process. In the steady state,  1   jt L . jt L bstituting this into 
eq. 
 Su







 . The 
smaller  , the slower is the adjustment of  y  to a new equilibrium and the bigger the effect of 
jt   that can only be observed in the long-run. If  1    (or  0   ), adjustment to the steady 
state is immediate and there is no sluggish adjustment at all. In this case, there is no effect that 
only occurs in the long-run. The model is transformed into a static model. 
In the following, we wish to estimate (3) by using our East German county level data set in 
order to identify effects of the elements of  jt   on  . This is subject to two major methodo-
logical challenges. The first is the role of unobserved time-varying variables that may have an 
effect on regional policy expenses, as discussed in the literature on empirical incidence analy-
sis that exploits variations in regional policies (BESLEY and CASE 2000; SMITH 2004). The 
second is the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable, as discussed in the literature on 
dynamic panel data models (BALTAGI, 2008, chapter 8; CAMERON and TRIVEDI, 2005, 763-
768). 
jt L
3.2  Endogeneity of policy variables 
Simply regressing observed employment figures on a set of regional characteristics and policy 
expenses will lead to biased estimates if not all relevant characteristics, which serve as control 
variables, can be observed. While some of these variables are routinely published by statisti-
cal agencies, such as land resources or climatic conditions, others are unlikely to be easily re-
corded, such as regional human or social capital. This approach, called ‘selection on observ-
ables’ (SMITH 2004, 297), will lead to spurious policy effects if such variables are omitted.  
However, utilising the panel structure of the data provides a remedy for this problem. If the 
effects of time-invariant characteristics can indeed be linearly separated, regional fixed-effects 
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will eliminate the bias originating from observed and unobserved heterogeneity, thus allowing 
for ‘selection on unobservables’ (SMITH 2004, 304). Forming first differences of (3) leads to: 
(4)     
0 1 2 1 1 jt jt
i
ijt ijt i jt jt jt jt x x L L L L                 ,  
where   denotes the i-th time-varying right-hand variable in  ijt x (3). This equation shows that 
the influence of observed and latent characteristics of regions, as far as they are time invari-
ant, as well as any other linear separable selection bias is ‘swept out’ of the equation. How-
ever, because   is correlated with  1  jt L 1  jt   from eq. (3),  2 1    jt jt L L  will be correlated with 
1  jt  jt    in eq. (4) (CAMERON and TRIVEDI, 2005, 765). This latter problem will be ad-
dressed in the next section. 
As noted by BESLEY and CASE (2000), a critical assumption in the estimation of equations 
like (3) is that the specification does not leave out any time-varying, region-specific variables 
that may have an influence on both  jt   and  . This assumption must be fulfilled for all of 
the estimators discussed before. We therefore briefly discuss the potential for policy endoge-
neity in our regressions. Clearly exogenous determinants of payment streams include price 
and subsidy levels as well as land endowments. All of these are likely to be either constant 
across regions (output prices and most factor prices and subsidy levels) or state-specific but 
time invariant (land resources). The former will be captured by a set of year dummies which 
are added to the estimating equation, the latter by regional fixed effects. Furthermore, trans-
fers that are not paid on the basis of voluntary participation of farmers, such as public good 
investments or measures affecting the downstream sector are exogenous to the model per se. 




 that cannot be controlled for by using 
fixed effects.  
BESLEY and CASE (2000) emphasise the importance of regional political variables that may 
have a bearing on regional policy design. This determinant can be largely ruled out here, as 
the underlying political decisions are mostly made on a European level, with only some lever-
age left at the Länder, but not at the Landkreis level. Whereas the procedures for calculating 
and administrating direct payments are mostly settled at the European and national level, 
Länder have freedom to allocate funds within their Rural Development Plans (to be cofi-
nanced from the EAGGF Guarantee section) and their Operational Programmes (in East Ger-
many to be cofinanced from the EAGGF Guidance section) (SCHUBERT 2002). Regional pro-
grammes are thus focusing on agri-environment and farm structures, and state governments 
can decide how to use funds from the modulation of direct payments. However, there is prac-
tically no decision power related to the CAP at the Landkreis level, our unit of observation. 
With regard to direct payments, critical variables in determining payment streams are which 
crops are planted and how many animals are kept in a given region. Similarly, the area under 
environmental-friendly practices or the farms’ investment activities are determining the ab-
sorption of agri-environmental measures or capital subsidies. While these are decision vari-
ables of the farm managers and thus potentially endogenous, we maintain the assumption that 
there is an “average” potential of a region to absorb these payments. This potential is assumed 
to be completely determined by the given environmental conditions and human resources of 
that region. It can thus be eliminated by fixed effects. Changes in this potential over time are 
neglected. 
Two variables that plausibly do vary across regions are the prices of labour as well as the lo-
cal demographic structure. Labour markets are typically local because of the inherent immo-
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bility of these factors. In addition, net migration out of rural areas has been particularly strong 
in the age class between 18 and 29 years and may have led to local shortages of labour (UH-
LIG 2008). It also may have wider implications in terms of public goods provision by the gov-
ernment. We capture these trends by including variables on wages and regional population 
density.
3 
3.3  Endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable 
Estimation of dynamic factor demand equations has been an active field of methodological 
research recently. The challenge has been to derive consistent estimators which are capable to 
eliminate fixed effects but nevertheless make efficient use of the data and perform well in 
samples of moderate size. As shown by NICKELL (1981), the traditionally employed least 
squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach to eliminate fixed effects in (3) will be inconsis-
tent if T is small, because   is endogenous. ANDERSON and HSIAO (1981) have suggested 
to eliminate fixed effects by first differencing and use   in an equation like 
1  jt L
2  jt L
1 
(4) to instru-
ment  , as   is uncorrelated with  2 1    jt jt L L 2  jt L  jt jt   . This approach yields consistent es-
timates if  . ARELLANO and BOND (1991) improved the efficiency of the instrumental 
variables approach by using further lags of the lagged dependent variable in the framework of 
a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. BLUNDELL and BOND (1998) showed 
that further efficiency gains are possible by also including lagged differences as instruments 
into a level equation of the dependent variable.  
  N
The former estimators are valid for large N and their properties in small sample sizes are gen-
erally not known. Analysts working with macro panels containing only a limited number of 
cross-sectional units have therefore argued that their usefulness for empirical work may be 
doubtful (JUDSON and OWEN, 1999). KIVIET (1995) has argued that the advantages of the 
LSDV approach in terms of efficiency could be combined with the consistency of the GMM 
estimators by using the latter for a correction of the former. Monte Carlo studies of small N 
and moderate T (for example  20 , 100   T N ) by JUDSON and OWEN (1999) used the correc-
tion factor developed by KIVIET (1995) to estimate a “corrected LSDV”. They show that it 
outperformed the GMM approaches both in terms of bias and efficiency. BRUNO (2005a) ex-
tended the correction procedure for application in unbalanced panels.  
4  Data 
In the present application, we work with  69  N , whereby the panel is slightly unbalanced. 
There is generally a coverage of 7 years in the right-hand variables, but the period covered 
differs by one year, depending on the state (Table 1). Furthermore, the number of lags avail-
able for the dependent variable varies between states. 
Table 1:  Overview of data coverage 






Dependent variable  1994-2006 (T=13)  1996-2006 (T=11)  1994-2006 (T=13) 
Right-hand variables   2000-2006 (T=7)  2000-2006 (T=7)  1999-2005 (T=7) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
                                                 
3   Data on land prices was not available with sufficient coverage to be included in the model. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive statistics 
   Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  N 
Brandenburg           
Employees 1st sector  n  2736  1267  227  5337  208 
Direct hectare payments   Mln EUR  18.330  10.673  0.914  45.410  112 
Direct livestock payments  Mln  EUR  3.534  2.258  0.074 11.025  112 
Development of rural areas  Mln EUR  4.149  3.134  0  17.412  112 
Processing and marketing  Mln EUR  0.303  0.678  0  3.597  112 
Investment aids   Mln EUR  0.879  0.648  0.001  3.286  112 
Less favoured areas  Mln EUR  1.581  0.852  0.082  3.351  112 
Agri-environment Mln  EUR  2.686  1.332  0.257  5.585  112 
Population density  n/km²  146  171  41  764  112 
Average annual wage all sectors  EUR  26.49  1.29  24.12  29.18  112 
Saxony            
Employees 1st sector  n  1734  854  109  3825  319 
Direct hectare payments   Mln EUR  8.593  6.194  0.022  22.790  203 
Direct livestock payments  Mln  EUR  1.013  0.757  0.016  3.930  203 
Development of rural areas  Mln EUR  3.400  2.728  0  10.694  203 
Processing and marketing  Mln EUR  0.375  2.202  0  24.298  203 
Investment aids   Mln EUR  0.871  0.881  0  4.096  203 
Less favoured areas  Mln EUR  0.559  0.694  0  3.088  203 
Agri-environment Mln  EUR  1.653  2.449  0  11.886  203 
Population density  n/km²  395  420  71  1696  203 
Average annual wage all sectors  EUR  25.11  1.71  21.21  30.93  203 
Saxony-Anhalt            
Employees 1st sector  n  1493  838  271  3924  312 
Direct hectare payments   Mln EUR  14.071  9.109  0.500  41.109  168 
Direct livestock payments  Mln  EUR  0.846  1.087  0.021  7.003  168 
Development of rural areas  Mln EUR  4.759  4.016  0  23.530  168 
Processing and marketing 
a Mln  EUR  0.324  1.103  -0.779  12.914  168 
Investment aids   Mln EUR  0.344  0.449  0  2.644  168 
Less favoured areas  Mln EUR  0.239  0.454  0  2.068  168 
Agri-environment Mln  EUR  1.019  1.032  0.049  4.860  168 
Population density  n/km²  254  396  42  1912  168 
Average annual wage all sectors  EUR  25.04  1.10  22.69  28.71  168 
Note: 
a There was occasional overpayment in some regions, which led to negative expenses in subsequent 
years. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Given this data set-up, there is no unambiguous preference for one of the estimation ap-
proaches outlined before, except that the uncorrected LSDV is theoretically inconsistent. 
However, it is clear that our N is much smaller than in the typical applications of panel data 
methods to firm or household data covering several thousands of observations. As such, the 
corrected LSDV results may be regarded as most reliable among the four. 
Data on CAP payments was collected from paying agencies of the state agricultural ministries 
for the periods given in Table 1. All other data was taken from official statistics (DESTATIS 
2009). Descriptive statistics by state are given in Table 2. 
7  
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5  Estimation results 
In the following, we show results for four different fixed effects specifications of eq. (3). We 
estimated the LSDV with a first order autoregressive lag as a naïve reference model (Model 
A) along with two asymptotically consistent estimators which differ in their instrument set, 
the Arellano-Bond (model B) and the Blundell-Bond (model C) estimator. Furthermore, we 
present results for a corrected LSDV estimator due to KIVIET (1995) and BRUNO (2005a) 
(model D), by using the Arellano-Bond results for initialisation.
4 
In addition to the lagged employment variable, the equation contains the seven policy aggre-
gates listed in Table 2. To analyse the effect of the Single Farm Payment (SFP), we add a 
dummy variable “Decoupling” which takes the value of one in 2005 and 2006, and zero be-
fore.
5 Furthermore, an average annual wage for all sectors, the regional population density, 
and year dummies for the period 2000-2004 are included. 
In model (B), one cross section of observations is lost due to first differencing. Models (A) to 
(C) use cluster robust standard errors based on the county variable, which controls for both se-
rial correlation and heteroscedasticity in model (A) (CAMERON and TRIVEDI 2005, 707). Mod-
els (B) and (C) report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and robust tests for serial cor-
relation due to ARELLANO and BOND (1991). The tests present no evidence of second-order 
autocorrelation. Model (D) uses bootstrapped standard errors. The hypothesis that estimated 
parameters are all zero was clearly rejected in all models, as indicated by the F- and χ²-
statistics. 
Comparing the p-values of models (B) to (D) in Table 3, there is no unambiguous ranking of 
estimators in terms of efficiency. Neither is the Blundell-Bond model clearly superior to the 
Arellano-Bond, nor does the corrected LSDV estimator outperform the other two.  
 
 
4   Estimations were carried out by using the routines xtreg, xtabond, and xtdpdsys implemented in Stata 11, as 
well as the user-written routine xtlsdvc due to BRUNO (2005b). 
5   For 2005 and 2006, direct payments under the SFP were split into area and livestock payments according to 
the average distribution of the latter between 2000 and 2002, following official calculation rules (BMVEL, 
2005).  
Table 3:  Regression estimates: policy impacts on employment in agriculture 
  LSDV  Arellano-Bond  Blundell-Bond  Corrected LSDV using (B) 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
Explanatory variables  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Ag employment (lagged one year)  0.64  ***  < 0.001  0.45  ***  < 0.001  0.81  ***  < 0.001  0.76  ***  < 0.001 
Direct  hectare  payments  -9.02   0.391  -15.61   0.176  12.88   0.136  -5.06   0.475 
Direct  livestock  payments  4.01   0.788  -8.06   0.645  25.64   0.160  7.46   0.517 
Development of rural areas  0.09    0.972  1.48    0.689  -4.71    0.416  0.05    0.988 
Processing  &  marketing  support  -6.38 **  0.029  -0.51   0.901  -1.56   0.696  -6.68   0.112 
Investment  aids  17.90 **  0.047  8.02   0.367  23.72 **  0.039  18.82   0.203 
Less  favoured  areas  -6.24   0.906  -63.96   0.330  -29.49   0.498  -0.81   0.980 
Agri-environmental  scheme  1.73   0.614  5.72   0.222  -0.20   0.968  0.78   0.873 
Decoupling  (1999-2004=0;  2005/6=1)  -97.90   0.110  -151.77 **  0.025  -120.88 **  0.047  -71.50 *  0.082 
Population  density  -0.37   0.393  -1.40 **  0.036  0.13    0.637  -0.13   0.786 
Average annual wage all sectors  -35.37  **  0.035  -47.81  *  0.071  4.53    0.506  -28.11    0.108 
Number  of  instruments  --     71     79     71    
Number  of  observations  483     414     483     483    
Notes:   All models include year dummies for 2000-2004 (parameters not reported). *** (**,*): significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
Model (A): Includes dummy variables for 69 clusters. Adj. R² (overall)=0.934. F-value (16,68)=75.53. p-value<0.001. Standard errors adjusted for 69 clusters. Model  
Model (B): Variables transformed into first differences. Lags of order two back to the maximum possible are used as GMM-type instruments for the lagged dependent 
variable using the one-step procedure. First differences of all right-hand variables used as standard instruments. Wald test of jointly zero coefficients χ² (16)=459.1. p-
value<0.001. Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation: p-value of order 1=0.021, p-value of order 2=0.219. Standard errors adjusted for 69 clusters. 
Model (C): Variables transformed into first differences. Lags of order two back to the maximum possible are used as GMM-type instruments for the lagged dependent 
variable in the differenced equation using the one-step procedure. Lagged differences used as GMM-type instruments for the lagged dependent variable in the level equa-
tion.  First differences of all right-hand variables used as standard instruments. Wald test of jointly zero coefficients χ² (16)=15503.7. p-value<0.001. Arellano-Bond test 
for zero autocorrelation: p-value of order 1<0.001, p-value of order 2=0.125. Standard errors adjusted for 69 clusters. 
Model (D): Standard errors bootstrapped with 100 replications. Correction procedure is based on BRUNO (2005a, b).  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Our interest focuses on the evidence concerning lagged adjustment and the effects of policy 
measures. All models consistently show that labour adjustment is sluggish, with a highly sig-
nificant coefficient of adjustment. However, the reported levels differ considerably. While the 
LSDV result must be assessed with caution due to the inconsistency of the estimator, model 
(C) reports a considerably higher value than (B). This is in line with the finding of BLUNDELL 
and BOND (1998) that the Arellano-Bond estimator may be downward biased. The Blundell-
Bond results are close to the corrected LSDV results, which implies that the coefficient of ad-
justment is at 24 percent. This means that, after a shock, it takes about two and a half years to 
move halfway to the new steady state.
6 This level of the adjustment coefficient is in the range 
of values found in other studies on dynamic labour adjustment, such as in STEFANOU et al. 
(1992) for German family farms and LUH and STEFANOU (1996) for US farms. 
With regard to policy effects, a first conclusion to be drawn is that most measures had no sig-
nificant impact on agricultural employment at all. There is weak evidence that processing and 
marketing aid reduces employment. However, the GMM models do not support this finding 
and also in the corrected LSDV the parameter does not pass the ten percent level of signifi-
cance. A bit stronger is the evidence on positive employment effects of investment support, 
which is significant at five percent in the LSDV and the Blundell-Bond models. According to 
the latter, one million euro of investment aid per region creates almost 24 jobs in agriculture 
in the short run. For this short run effect, 42 thousand euro annually are required to create one 
additional job. Given the logic of our model, full adjustment to a new employment equilib-
rium takes time, so that the full effects are visible only in the long run. Using the adjustment 
coefficient of model (C), the long run effect is 125 jobs in the steady state per one additional 
million euro of investment aid paid now. However, this result is not borne out in the corrected 
LSDV model. 
A result consistently supported by models (B) to (D) is that there were significant employ-
ment losses in the years 2005 and 2006. Our interpretation is that this is due to the introduc-
tion of the decoupled SFP. It is unlikely that a severe macro effect, such as price drop, caused 
this fall in employment, as the revenue and profit situation of farms in Germany had notably 
improved in 2005 compared to previous years (BMELV 2007, 17). According to our view, 
decoupling broke the link between payments and labour allocations necessary for the mainte-
nance of certain farm activities. The estimates range from 72 to 152 agricultural jobs per re-
gion that were lost due to decoupling in the short run (Table 4). Mean employment in the first 
sector per region was 1893 persons in the observed period, so that the SFP on average implied 
losses of 4 to 8 percent of jobs in agriculture. In the long run, these effects are even more dra-
matic, ranging from 276 (model B) to 637 (model C) job losses due to decoupling, or up to 
one third of all jobs in agriculture. 
Table 4:  Average short- and long-run job losses per region due to the 2005/6 effect 






Short-run losses (persons)  -152  -121  -72 
Long-run losses (persons)  -276  -637  -298 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Models (A) and (B) also produced significant parameters on population density and the over-
all wage level. The negative signs imply that fewer people work on farm in regions which are 
more densely populated and where wages are higher, which is a plausible result. 
                                                 
6   The median length of the lag can be obtained by solving for   in   (HAMERMESH 1993, 248), which 
is  . 
 t 5 . 0
* 
t 
5 . 0 log 
 t
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6  Conclusions 
Our regression analysis of CAP payments in three German States reveals that there were few 
desirable effects on job maintenance or job creation in agriculture. The results are based on 
four specifications of a dynamic employment equation with fixed effects estimated on county 
level data. The specifications differ in how they eliminate the fixed effects and how they deal 
with the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable. We found that agricultural employ-
ment adjusts slowly to shocks. On average, it takes about two and a half years to move half-
way to the new steady state. Direct payments for crops and livestock, measures for the devel-
opment of rural areas, transfers to less favoured areas and agro-environmental measures had 
no employment effect at all. Processing and marketing support to the downstream sector im-
plied job losses in one of the four specifications. There was a significant loss of jobs in agri-
culture in 2005 and 2006. We suspect that this may have been a consequence of decoupling. 
Due to this effect, in the long run, up to one third of agricultural jobs per region are at stake. 
The evidence presented here suggests that the only way to actively promote job creation in the 
CAP framework is via capital subsidies. These subsidies are mostly used to finance buildings 
or machinery. Apparently these increases in capital use were sufficiently complementary to 
labour that they induced relatively higher employment, that is they slowed down labour cuts. 
According to our estimates, 42 thousand euro of subsidies are required annually to create one 
additional job in the short run. However, capital subsidies are more effective in the long run, 
as they also affect the steady state equilibrium labour demand. Furthermore, it should be 
stressed that this finding is supported by only two of the four econometric specifications. 
We therefore conclude that, in the three East German States, the CAP mostly misses its target 
of safeguarding jobs. Potentially positive effects due to capital subsidies were counteracted by 
the recent decoupling of direct payments. Given the policy perspective to “modulate” further 
funds away from direct payments, this analysis calls into question whether an expansion of 
second pillar measures is a reasonable way to use the modulated funds. 
The analysis here has focused on the goal of job creation in agriculture. With regard to other 
goals that may have been achieved by the CAP, such as environmental stewardship or the so-
cial goal of income redistribution, we can only conclude that their potential achievement at 
least has not made jobs in agriculture safer. 
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